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Abstract 
 Social Engineering (SE) attacks are the most prevalent attacks targeting multiple 
industries, companies, and organizations. This research discusses the reasons for the prevalence 
of SE attacks and the weaknesses of the defense methods against it—Information Security 
Awareness Trainings (ISAT). Through an extensive literature review of the methods, 
experiments, and ideas of the past 20 years, the research compiles best practices for an effective 
ISAT program that is capable of changing employee behaviors and strengthening companies' 
security posture through its human element. The literature review is divided into two main 
sections. The first section is about the components that should be common to any type or format 
of ISAT regardless of the way it is delivered to the employees. The second section is about four 
different delivery methods by which companies could conduct ISAT and those are: (1) Lecture-
Based Delivery Method; (2) Programs/ Interactive Games Delivery Method; (3) Group-Oriented 
Delivery Method; (4) Simulated Attack Delivery Method. From the literature review, it was 
determined that an amazing body of work related to designing and delivering an effective ISAT 
exists and that companies just need to find a way that works for them. Standard training is 
largely ineffective and thus companies must put in the time and effort to create materials that are 
relevant to their employees and combine multiple delivery methods. It is also important to note 
that ISAT should be a continuous year-round activity and not just done once a year or once in a 
lifetime. If companies learn to be patient and work out different trial and error scenarios, they 
will eventually find something that works best for them and as it matures, they will see an 
immense return on investment and an improvement of their overall security posture.  
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Definitions 
Below are some reoccurring abbreviations that have been included here for convenience.   
ISAT Information Security Awareness Training is the training given to employees to let 
them know the dos and don'ts of using technology with the goal of informing 
employees about security policies and procedures and preventing them from 
introducing security risks to the company.  
SE Social Engineering is the manipulating human emotions or tricking victims into giving 
up personal or company confidential information by exploiting their trusting nature 
and their willingness to help others 
BHSE Black Hat Social Engineers exploit people's weaknesses through phishing or another 
SE technique to obtain confidential information with the goal of using the information 
obtained to cause them harm. They could also be interested in harming the 
organization where the victims work.   
InfoSec Stands for Information Security is the practice of preventing unauthorized access, use, 
disclosure, disruption, modification, inspection, recording or destruction of 
information. The information or data may be electronic or physical. 
IT Stands for Information Technology and it refers to anything related to computing 
technology, such as networking, hardware, software, the Internet, or the people that 
work with these technologies.  
ISA Information Security Awareness focuses on raising consciousness regarding potential 
risks of the rapidly evolving forms of information and the rapidly evolving threats to 
that information, which target human behavior.  
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Introduction  
 Workers in the information technology (IT) industry all agree that phishing, the 
fraudulent practice of inducing unaware individuals to reveal sensitive information about 
themselves or their company, is growing immensely and affecting the employees of many 
companies and organizations (Ki-Aries & Faily, 2017; McCormac et al., 2016; Flores & Ekstedt, 
2016; Purkait, 2012; Ohaya, 2006; Orgill, 2004). The fraudulent practice perpetrators, for the 
purpose of this research, will be referenced as Black-Hat Social Engineers (BHSE). BHSE 
exploit people's weaknesses through phishing or another SE technique to obtain confidential 
information with the goal of using the information obtained to cause them harm. They could also 
be interested in harming the organization where the victims work. SE is about manipulating 
human emotions or tricking victims into giving up personal or company confidential information 
by exploiting their trusting nature and their willingness to help others (Dominguez et al., 2010; 
Frauenstein & Solms, 2009). Phishing attempts are forms of SE that have many variations, 
employ various tactics, constantly updated and quickly increasing in number and sophistication 
(Purkait, 2012; Kumaraguru et al., 2007; Ohaya 2006; Orgill, 2004).  
 According to Purkait (2012), "Phishing has become the most common channel for thieves 
to acquire personal information to aid them in identity theft". The typical way by which BHSE 
conduct phishing involves tricking victims into accessing a fake website by sending a fake e-
mail, which looks reputable and contains a link that leads to a replica of a legitimate website. 
The legitimate look of the website deceives unaware users by providing them a sense of safety to 
disclose sensitive information under the false pretense that the website they are accessing is 
legitimate (Kumaraguru et al., 2010). In some cases, the attack leverages social media of targeted 
users to offer more personalized emails that guarantee a response from the victim (Jagetic et al., 
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2007). Some of the phishing attacks conducted by seasoned BHSE involve tricking the victim 
into believing that they are an acquaintance. According to Jagetic et al. (2007), people are four 
times more likely to become phishing victims if a person appearing to be a known acquaintance 
solicits them. 
 As for the typical way of educating employees about the issue, it involves developing 
some form of Information Security Awareness Training (ISAT) module (Dominguez et al., 2010; 
Cooper, 2008). While many companies are realizing the momentousness of cyber security 
awareness training to diminish phishing risks (Caldwell, 2016; Shropshire et al., 2006), most of 
the training widely available to them is full of flaws (Ghafir et al., 2018; Ki-Aries & Faily, 2017; 
Caldwell, 2016; Shaw et al., 2008; Valentine 2006). These flaws hinder the advancement of the 
training to match the advancement of BHSE skills and techniques in gaining access to 
confidential data (Ohaya, 2006). The goal of this research is to establish that there is a gap 
between the quality of BHSE attacks (Flores & Ekstedt, 2016) and the quality of ISAT products 
available on the market to educate employees about the risks of not following good security 
practices (Cooper, 2008; Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2009; Caldwell, 2016). In addition, the 
research establishes that the gap could be narrowed down if companies prioritize training. BHSE 
attacks are consistently advancing and ISAT is failing to keep up.  
 
  
Page 7 of 50 
 
Contribution of Employees and Companies to Phishing 
 Prevalence of phishing is a credit to a joint effort between both employees and 
companies, thus, realizing each of their contribution to phishing is a great first step in stopping 
the wide spreading of phishing attacks. O’Donnell (2009) states that for the "last five years, 
phishing has been growing rapidly, with an estimate citation of approximately 8 million daily 
phishing attempts all over the world" (as cited in Lungu & Tăbuşcă, 2010). Furthermore, a report 
issued by the Anti-Phishing Working Group, in 2006, compiled 23,670 unique phishing attempts 
targeting 14,191 websites with the goal of committing malicious activity like identity theft and 
fraud (Dodge et al., 2007). According to BBC.co.uk (2017), the WannaCry Ransomware attack 
on the NHS in May 2017 "resulted in [a] significant meltdown of emergency services in the 
United Kingdom (UK)" (as cited in Ghafir et al., 2018). This issue could have been prevented 
had employees of NHS been trained on how to have good security practices (Ghafir et al., 2018). 
According to 2019, State of Phish report, released by Proofpoint security awareness training, 
"Across the board, [information security (InfoSec)] professionals identified a more active SE 
landscape in 2018. The vast majority—96%—said the rate of phishing attacks either increased or 
stayed consistent throughout the year, and more respondents said they experienced more attacks 
during 2018 than 2017" (Proofpoint, 2019).  
 Organizations attribute many security incidents they face to insiders and not external 
parties. Pricewaterhouse Coppers (PWC) (2015) findings suggest, "The behaviors of current 
employees were the source of 34% of security incidents" (as cited in McCormac et al., 2016). Ki-
Aries & Faily (2017) emphasizes a point on the 2015 data breach report by PWC stating that a 
large number of internal data breaches were due to accidental employee error or employee's 
malicious intent. It is usually hard for users to detect signatures of fake websites and emails 
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because they appear legitimate. Many anti-phishing tools are available and could detect phishing 
emails and notify the users, but it does not help if the users ignore the messages (Kumaraguru et 
al., 2010). According to psychologists, people make poor and irrational decisions when under 
stress; they call it a singular evaluation approach to decision making. Stress could be simply an 
employee checking their emails while busy at work (Kumaraguru et al., 2007). Employees' 
decisions, under stress, could lead to them accidentally click on malicious links. End-users 
usually put security as a secondary task, when they access a service, say their bank account; their 
primary task is to check their account and not necessarily to check if they are actually accessing 
the legitimate website for their bank (Kumaraguru et al., 2007).  
 People [employees of a company or an organization] are the first line of defense against 
many information security threats (ENISA, 2006; PWC, 2010). It turns out, that the best way to 
exploit the weaknesses of this first line of defense involves the use of people—BHSE. It ends up 
being much easier for BHSE to tap into people's weaknesses than trying to bypass security 
implemented by companies who often use firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS), intrusion 
prevention systems (IPS), and other network equipment and computer security measures. 
Internal employees using the system have access to it without needing to go through the security 
systems implemented by the company to prevent access by non-internal users (Scott, 2009). 
Now, BHSE do not need to study the system they plan to attack or look for weakness, but rather 
they just need to develop their SE skills (Lungu & Tăbuşcă, 2010; Frauenstein & Solms, 2009).  
 Companies implicitly augment the prevalence of phishing attacks by putting tremendous 
emphasis on buying new hardware equipment and the latest and greatest bells and whistles to 
prevent hacking and data security breaches and forgetting, ignoring or neglecting the human 
element (Ghafir et al., 2018; Dominguez et al., 2010; Frauenstein & Solms, 2009). A survey 
Page 9 of 50 
 
conducted by Kessel and Allan (2013) showed that "93% of companies globally are maintaining 
or increasing their investments in cyber-security to combat the ever-increasing threat from 
Cyberattacks" (as cited in Flores & Ekstedt, 2016). Most of that money, if not all of it, goes 
toward securing company physical assets like computers and network equipment. Companies 
focusing only on securing their perimeters from the outside world are not minimizing the risks of 
falling victim to security incidents. Organizations tend to forget that, "The security of any system 
is [like] a chain of components, only as strong as the least secure one. Confidence or assurance is 
also a chain, as strong as the least trusted link" (Dominguez et al., 2010). Even if organizations 
apply the best technology and numerous layers of strong defenses to mitigate security problems, 
all it takes is a small mistake from one of their members to undermine the strength of the security 
(Ög˘ütçü et al., 2016; Dominguez et al., 2010; Shaw et al., 2008; Dodge et al., 2007). Phishing 
attacks can be catastrophic for victim companies; the cost is usually gauged based on three 
categories of damages: (1) loss of productivity from employees, (2) business impact through the 
loss of proprietary information, and (3) damage to business reputations. According to the State of 
the Phish Report, which surveyed nearly 15,000 InfoSec professionals, "67% of InfoSec teams 
surveyed said they suffered a loss of productivity for employees, 54% suffered business impact 
through a loss of proprietary information, and 50% suffered damages to business reputations" 
(Proofpoint, 2019).   
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ISAT as a Solution 
 Kumaraguru et al. (2010) define three categories of strategies to deal with phishing 
attacks. The first one is silently eliminating the threat by finding and taking down malicious 
websites and deleting phishing emails automatically. The second one is warning users about the 
threat by using toolbars, browser extensions, and other mechanisms. The final one is training the 
end users not to fall for the attacks through ISAT programs. Many experts recommend ISAT as 
one of the best solutions to address the human element of cyber security breaches (Dodge et al., 
2007) along with other approaches like automated detection (Kumaraguru et al., 2010). Shaw et 
al. (2008) report that one of the reasons for the reduction between 2004-2006 on the number of 
reported security breaches was due to the investment of small and medium-size companies in 
InfoSec technology and ISAT programs. This continues to be the case in 2019. According to 
Proofpoint State of the Phish Report (2019), "57% of InfoSec Professionals said they have been 
able to quantify a reduction in phishing susceptibility based on their training activities; this is a 
6% increase from what was reported in 2017" (Proofpoint, 2019). Furthermore, "In a survey 
conducted in 2004 by Ernst & Young, respondents named lack of security awareness by users as 
the top obstacle to effective information security" (as cited in Dominguez et al., 2010). Public 
officials, security researchers, and organizations have recommended ISAT (McCrohan et al., 
2010). For example, the United States Military Academy (USMA) has actively been 
implementing hands-on exercises to teach security best practices, including email phishing 
exercises (Dodge et al., 2007).  An Executive Order issued by President Bush in May 2006 
declared, "that in its effort to protect the public against identity theft, the US Federal Government 
needs to improve its public outreach aimed at educating the public about the risk of identity theft, 
including advising them of measures that can be undertaken to protect personal data" (as cited in 
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Butler, 2006). McCrohan et al. (2010) include part of a 2009 statement by the press secretary 
upon the conclusion of the cyberspace review. It stated that "[c]alls for training and awareness 
predate Presidential Decision Directive NSC-63 [of 1998], the Clinton Administration’s directive 
on security in cyberspace, and are part of President Obama’s comprehensive review to ensure a 
secure global digital information and communications infrastructure". Investing in raising 
employees' security awareness is thus vital to the protection of companies' sensitive data.   
 While ISAT is the solution, organizations cannot just decide to buy some training 
package, check a box, and claim that issue is solved and move on; the training must meet certain 
criteria in order for it to be effective. The goal that ISAT is trying to achieve is complicated as, at 
its core, it is trying to harden "human assets" of a company (Cooper, 2008); it is by far the 
hardest asset to harden—a direct result of the fact that humans are the weakest link in the 
protection of an Organization InfoSec system (Ghafir et al., 2018; Caldwell, 2016; Flores & 
Ekstedt, 2016; Shropshire et al., 2014; Furnell & Clarke, 2012; Dominguez et al., 2010; 
McCrohan et al., 2010; Frauenstein & Solms, 2009; Shaw et al., 2008; Butler, 2006; Orgill, 
2004; Schultz et al., 2001). The weaknesses of humans lie in their malicious intent or their 
carelessness in not following good security compliance behaviors (Shropshire et al., 2014). 
Shropshire et al. (2014) go further to explain that, "Each individual end user represents an 
endpoint in a computer network or a system and without security-compliant behaviors on the part 
of each end user; the network will not be secure[d]". Whitman (2003) identifies secure behaviors 
on part of end users to include things like patching software application, scanning for viruses, 
having a change password policy, and performing backup for data. "In addition, many end users 
lack the ability to appraise security risks and identify appropriate countermeasures" (as cited in 
Shropshire et al., 2014). In order for companies and organizations to minimize the risk of 
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breaches from employees' faults, they must make sure that all their employees develop 
Information Security Awareness (ISA) (Shaw et al., 2008). Kruger & Kearney (2006) define the 
focus of ISA as "the extent to which an employee understands the importance and implications 
of InfoSec policies, rules and guidelines, and, the extent to which they behave in accordance with 
these policies, rules and guidelines" (as cited in McCormac et al., 2016).       
 Research by IBM Global Technology Services (2014) claimed that about 95 percent of 
security incidents were human errors related. Thus, "security is not a problem of technology, but 
a problem of human nature and the behavior of information systems users and information 
system security awareness needs to be assessed and evaluated accordingly" (Ög˘ütçü et al., 
2016). The most effective way to prevent phishing attempts is through educating the end-users 
(the victims) so that they do not fall for it (Dominguez et al., 2010). More importantly is that the 
education program should be robust to ensure that workers understand their responsibilities and 
organization policies as they relate to IT and protection of resources they use constantly (Shaw et 
al., 2008).  
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ISAT Shortcomings 
 As important as ISAT is, neither the program designers nor the organizations applying 
the training give it the importance it deserves. Valentine (2006) writes, "This is the problem that 
security engineers and systems administrators have faced for the last 20 years.  First, they spend 
half their time struggling with end users who open every single attachment that shows up in their 
inbox. The other half of their time, they spend working to convince upper-management that 
information security is . . . an important issue – a business issue – and one that needs to be 
included in next year’s budget". In order for the training to be effective, the employees receiving 
the training along with their managers should feel that the training is important; many times, the 
users do not believe they had security concerns (Flores & Eksedt, 2016). Mistrust of ISAT 
program is understandable especially given the fact that many training programs are mediocre in 
their quality and effectiveness (Ghafir et al., 2018; Ki-Aries & Faily, 2017; Caldwell, 2016; 
Shaw et al., 2008; Valentine, 2006).  
 One of the biggest issues with traditional out-of-the-box ISAT programs is that they 
provide "a static solution to a fluid problem" (Cooper, 2008); they are not structured in a way to 
fit different organizations needs and sometimes they do not have a structure at all (Ki-Aries & 
Faily, 2017; Valentine, 2006). Different companies have different weak points and different 
types of people. The majority of ISAT programs do not account for such changes. The training is 
often lead by a security professional with no input from the users (Cooper, 2008). Typically, 
ISAT programs are not up to date (Cooper, 2008; Dominguez et al., 2010) and the security 
information they contain lacks "relevance, timeliness, and consistency" (Shaw et al., 2008). 
Users are generally not motivated to read about security or educate themselves about phishing 
(Kumaraguru et al., 2010; Kumaraguru et al. 2007; Valentine, 2006); the last thing they want is a 
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boring and irrelevant ISAT program. In addition, "information risk profiles never stop changing" 
(Shaw et al., 2008). "Rohyt Belani, CEO and co-founder of PhishMe . . . [stated that] standard 
[ISAT] modules can actually disengage employees . . . because they are typically boring and out 
of context, allowing employees to ignore or quickly click through without engaging with the 
security content being offered" (as cited in Caldwell, 2016). According to Ki-Aries & Faily 
(2017), "Research suggests current security awareness approaches do not entirely meet this 
requirement of designing for the user". Furthermore, "Some approaches rely on invocations of 
fear to change behaviors, or result in a lack of motivation and ability to meet unrealistic 
expectations, which may derive from poorly designed security systems and policies". Many 
pieces of training are framed in a way of directing people to do something but fail to provide a 
reason—the why (Cooper, 2008).  
 Many ISAT programs that organizations implement fail to have a follow-up element to 
them to make sure that the participants have retained the information they supposedly learned 
from the training (Caldwell, 2016). They often lack incident response procedures (Valentine, 
2006). Shaw et al. (2008) state that most ISAT programs available fail to bridge the gap between 
perception and behavior. Ian Trump, a security lead at LOGICnow mentions another problem 
with ISAT program, which is the fact that "it's difficult to record success. When [ISAT] works – 
when a phishing email is not opened – nothing happens and it’s business as usual" (as cited in 
Caldwell, 2016).  
 ISATs developers themselves do not give enough focus to the quality of the training they 
create or hold it at the same importance as other security solutions (Dominguez et al., 2010; 
Valentine, 2006). When developers design and implement ISAT programs, they usually intend 
for it to achieve a compliance aspect (Ki-Aries & Faily, 2017); they could care less if employees 
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retain the information after they conclude the program. ISATs facilitators and planners do not 
conduct ISAT on regular basis and execute it badly and in an ineffective way (Caldwell, 2016). 
A successful ISAT program must account for all the weakness that this research mentioned. 
Multiple scholarly articles proposed approaches that deal with these issues. The rest of the 
research will cover those solutions and add more to the literature by suggesting combinations of 
the solutions presented to ensure companies deliver a continuous, holistic, customizable, and 
engaging ISAT program.         
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Methods 
 This literature review will cover the past twenty years looking for proposed solutions for 
effective ISAT programs. The articles were gathered through a search in Google Scholar and 
using Portland State University Library, ACM Digital Library, and Academic Search Premier. In 
addition, some journals were obtained through Elsevier. The search used the following 
keywords:  "Information Security", "Security Awareness", "Security Training", "Social 
Engineering", and "Phishing".  
 An annotated bibliography was performed in all the articles that were obtained through 
the search terms and the ones relevant to the research were kept, and the rest were discarded. The 
journal articles that were kept went through a deeper analysis process looking for citations within 
them that mention relevant journals to the topic of effective cyber security awareness training. 
Many of the citations within the articles kept cited other articles that were already part of the 
initial list. However, some articles were obtained from the sources kept, and were not in the 
initial pool of relevant articles. This process continued until all the relevant articles that were 
referenced were part of the list. The new articles obtained through this process were analyzed 
and they provided valuable information to the specific topic that this research is addressing. 
 The rest of the research will be a thorough analysis of all the suggestions for effective 
training approaches that were obtained from all the articles. The proposed suggestions are 
divided into two sections. The first section is components of effective training and the second 
section suggests delivery methods for effective training.  The four delivery methods suggested 
are (1) Lecture-Based Delivery Method; (2) Programs/ Interactive Games Delivery Method; (3) 
Group-Oriented Delivery Method and; (4) Simulated Attack Delivery Method.   
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Literature Review 
 The literature offers many suggestions to enhance the quality of ISAT programs so that 
the training achieves its goals of raising employees' security awareness and having a lasting 
impact. The solution involves two steps. The first step is a collection of common components 
and frameworks that should be part of every ISAT program, which will be discussed in the 
"Components of Effective Training" section. Then the second step is to pick one or multiple of 
four delivery methods discussed above. 
Components of Effective Training 
 Frauenstein & Solms (2009) offers a model that would allow for the implementation of a 
holistic ISAT program. Their holistic approach contains three equal dimensions that companies 
should consider to enhance their security posture and to have a set of standards, guidelines and 
best practices that governs all of the three dimensions. The three dimensions are technological 
factors, organizational factors, and the human factor. Technological factors are about investing in 
security hardware and following security best practices of backups, patching, etc. while 
organizational factors have to do with human resources recruitment of skilled and trustworthy 
staff. Additionally, organization factors include making recruited staff aware of policies, 
standards and the reprimands for failure to comply. As for the human factor, they recommend 
ISAT programs that are up-to-date, relevant to issues that affect the company and have incentive 
or humor in order to engage employees. 
 Dominguez et al. (2010) offer a framework for the human factor element addressed in 
Frauenstein & Solms (2009)—that is a framework for implementing an effective ISAT program. 
The research bases their proposed framework on empirical data from a Puerto Rican study of two 
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highly regulated industries, banking, and insurance, with the goal of maximizing the return on 
investment pertaining to ISAT programs. There are seven inputs to any ISAT program, the more 
inputs added, the higher the quality of the ISAT program. The seven inputs in no particular order 
are: (1) Management Support; (2) Assessment (some form of quizzes to validate understanding 
and listen to users' inputs); (3) Policies; (4) Auditing; (5) SE Awareness; (6) Compliance and (7) 
Technology Tools (delivering training using advanced technology that can reach multiple people, 
like online recorded training). 
 The human factor is the focus of this research. In order to strengthen the human factor of 
security, organizations need to implement ISAT programs that are effective in raising employees' 
awareness of SE and have certain elements to them regardless of the chosen delivery method for 
the training. Most of these elements are best summarized through the nine lessons learned in 
Cooper (2008) while they were implementing an ISAT program at West Virginia University 
(WVU) for their students and employees. The first two lessons are to have a policy in place and 
seek and obtain approval of the policy to cover all constituencies before commencing with the 
training. These lessons agree with Frauenstein & Solms (2009) where they stated that policy and 
guidelines cover the three factors of the holistic ISAT program—including the human factor.     
 The third lesson is to "fully investigate and understand the content of any commercial 
package that is being considered for implementation" (Cooper, 2008). While Valentine (2006) 
discusses the merits of companies using widely available "Pre-Packaged Awareness Training" 
programs and offering those pieces of training as "fully formalized product line with live 
seminars", he also argues that they are quickly becoming obsolete (Valentine, 2006). Valentine 
(2006) discussed three merits that he liked. The first is that when organizations would buy those 
packages, they would offer it to all their employees with clearly set expectations so that 
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employees understand both the "what" and "why" relative to the policy. Second, he liked that the 
pieces of training are readily offered in an "assembly line" nature, which allows for a uniform 
and low-cost training that can reach multiple employees without any geographical boundaries. 
Finally, he liked that the curriculum could be easily adapted to fit organization needs. Valentine 
(2006) offers a solution to the obsolescence limitation that would grow the programs from their 
infancy using a fully realized multi-phased approach following specific methodology tailored to 
organization's needs and their specific security weak points. The multi-phased approach includes 
three key components: (1) Assessment Phase, (2) Identification Phase, and (3) Education Phase. 
In the assessment phase companies asses what assets they wish to protect along with their attack 
vectors; which employees are vulnerable to which attack vectors. In the identification phase, 
companies determine which employees interact with which data they identified in the assessment 
phase. By doing so, companies can be sure to break out of the "Security Basics" model and offer 
specialized training that is engaging and relevant to their employees. The third phase, the 
education phase, involves knowledge transfer that companies could achieve through a simulated 
attack approach as will be discussed later. The first two phases, involve finding the difference in 
the audience that will participate in the ISAT program. In McCoy & Fowler (2004), they found 
that it is important to define the different audiences the security training is targeting in the early 
stages of planning. For example, when they were implementing ISAT program for their 
university they quickly realized that splitting the audiences to simply students and faculty/staff 
was not sophisticated enough to account for differences within the students' group and the 
faculty/staff's group.   
 Reaching variety of audiences is critical that two separate pieces of research, one in 2016 
and another in 2017, specifically focused in ways to identify the different audience in order to 
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create ISAT materials that are relevant to all the groups within the organization. First is the 
McCormac et al. (2016) research, which focused on individual differences as a mean to help 
ISAT programs developer determine which variables in human difference effect individuals' ISA 
and thus design tailored ISAT programs. The variables that were under study are age, gender, 
personality (using The Big Five model), and risk-taking propensity (the tendency of an 
individual to either take or avoid risks). The Big Five personality model has five factors and 
these are neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. These 
researchers measured the variables using a questionnaire called "The Human Aspects of 
Information Security Questionnaire (HAIS-Q)" that was developed based on the knowledge, 
attitude, and behavior (KAB) model and distributed to 505 individuals (286 females and 219 
males). For the age distribution, 12% of participants were in the range of 18-29, approximately 
25% in each of the 30-39 and 40-49 ranges, approximately 22% in the 50-59 range, and 15% 
over 60. The participants were from 13 different sectors and 8 job areas including sales, laborers, 
professionals, management, and technicians/trade workers. The study found that 
conscientiousness, agreeableness, neuroticism, and risk-taking propensity significantly explained 
variance in individuals ISA, while age and gender did not (McCormac et al., 2016).  
 The second research conducted by Ki-Aries & Faily (2017), which assists ISAT 
designers and developers to find out how to cater their programs to multiple individuals by 
identifying security related human factors using personas. Personas are archetypical descriptions 
of users that embody their goals. This is the only research to date that uses the human-computer 
interaction (HCI) method to integrate human factors into ISAT using personas. The persona-
centered ISAT methodology cycle involves six ongoing stages that can be embedded into 
business-as-usual activities with 90-days cycle of awareness activities. The six stages are (1) 
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establishing needs and goals using business supported requirements, (2) Personas, (3) Analysis, 
(4) Design & Development, (5) Implementation, and (6) Review.  
 The first stage involves eliciting requirements like, "assessments, surveys, and focus 
groups to establish business needs and current security culture, locations, risks, roles, 
responsibilities, resource, budget, and any other identified project related dependencies" (Ki-
Aries & Faily, 2017). The second stage, and most crucial, is integrating personas. This is done by 
first organizing interviews with a random pool of users across the organization and using the 
results of the interviews to construct personas. The research recommends recording the 
interviews rather than taking notes to keep most of the information gathered intact. The 
information is then used to construct attitudes, motivations and business context for different 
personas and give each of those personas associated characteristics and a representative 
photograph to help humanize the persona. The third stage is the critical analysis of business 
needs, risks, and requirements against the identified behaviors and characteristics of each 
persona in order to establish and prioritize awareness needs. The fourth stage is designing and 
developing the tailored content to fit the data gathered from the previous three stages. The fifth 
stage is implementing and rolling out the program using a strategy defined at this stage. The final 
stage is to review and use the feedback to keep the program up to date and reflective of 
companies' needs (Ki-Aries & Faily, 2017).  
 Applying those steps to an actual company X, Ki-Aries & Faily (2017) found that, 
"persona-centered information security awareness approach has the capacity to adapt to the time 
and resource required for its implementation within the business, and offers a positive 
contribution towards reducing or mitigating Information Security risks through security 
awareness" (Ki-Aries & Faily, 2017).   
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 Back to the Cooper (2008) article, the next two lessons that they learned are: (1) that 
companies should conduct a full assessment of the efforts to develop their own content; and (2) 
keep in mind that their best estimate of time and resources will most likely be exceeded. The 
sixth lesson learned is for companies to "follow the steps that prove to be successful and involve 
as many people as possible in the review steps" (Cooper, 2008). The seventh lesson is for 
companies to utilize "project management skills and avoid introducing requirements that may not 
have been a part of the initial planning of the project, while nevertheless failing to adjust 
schedule and budget" (Cooper, 2008). It is important for companies to use a Learning 
Management System that is common to all their constituencies is the eights lesson. The ninth and 
final lesson is to for companies to never give up and forge forward because successful ISAT 
program is both important and achievable for all employees of an organization.  
 Another recommendation to keep in mind, and that is not covered by the nine lessons 
from Cooper (2008) is mentioned in McCoy & Fowler (2004), where they found it helpful to 
have some branding for consistency and recognition and thus they created a logo and a yearly 
changeable theme. The curriculum is year round and every month has its own theme topic, for 
example, January's theme was "Password Safety & Security". Another important point was 
raised in Valentine (2006) research where they mentioned that ISAT should include an incident 
response element that is given to more employees rather than reserving it to incident response 
teams. Some companies do not even have an incident response team and it is more critical for 
those companies to integrate incident response to their ISAT program.  
Delivery Methods 
 Once a company carefully designs a program based on the "Components of Effective 
Training" section and finds out their target audience and the content they need to cover, it is time 
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to pick the delivery method. An organization may pick one method or a combination of the 
method depending on what they see as most effective and within the limits of their constraints. 
The four delivery methods suggested by the literature are lecture-based, interactive games and 
programs, group-oriented, and finally simulated attacks delivery method. The research 
summarizes multiple works of literature that have tried and evaluated a single or combination of 
these four delivery methods.     
Lecture-Based Delivery Method 
 The lecture-based approach delivers the content via online training, instructor-led 
training, or a combination of the two. It involves the use of multimedia, visual aids, quizzes, 
tests, etc. In the lecture-based delivery method, the content may be delivered in the form of 
hypermedia, multimedia, hypertext, or a combination. In Shaw et al. (2008), they conducted a 
laboratory experiment to investigate the impact of hypermedia, multimedia, and hypertext on 
increasing information security awareness among three awareness levels using an online training 
environment. They defined hypermedia as an interactive medium consisting of graphics, audio, 
video, plain text and hyperlinks that are all intertwined together to create a non-linear medium of 
delivery. Multimedia and hypertext are both defined as linear methods of delivery. The 
difference is that in multimedia, there are interactive elements, like hypermedia, but user 
accesses them in a linear fashion. On the other hand, hypertext is plain text with hyperlinks that 
lacks feedback capability and multiple cues.  
 The three awareness levels that the study used as a metric for each of the three forms of 
delivery were perception, comprehension, and projection. They defined perception as user's 
sense and ability to detect potential risk in their workplace. Comprehension was defined as the 
user's ability to assess and understand the dangers posed by different security risks and 
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projection is about the user's ability to predict the future course of security attacks. A user at the 
projection level would have the highest level of understanding of their environment and would 
be trusted to make timely decisions in emergencies. The results indicated the following: (1) that 
learners who have better understanding at the perception and comprehension levels can improve 
understanding at the projection level; (2) learners with text material perform better at the 
perception level; and (3) learners with multimedia material perform better at the comprehension 
level and projection level (Shaw et al., 2008). Thus when developing a lecture-based approach it 
is a good idea for developers to use hypertext materials to increase learners' perception, then use 
multimedia materials to increase learners' comprehension and projection. An effective lecture-
based approach must be one that is capable of improving learner's understanding at the 
projection level. 
 Some literature implemented a lecture-based approach with an online element like 
McCoy & Fowler (2004) and Cooper (2008) and integrated additional reinforcement methods for 
topics learned during the online training they offered. Others like Robilla and Ragucci (2006) 
and McCrohan et al. (2010) went with strictly instructor-led training. Robilla and Ragucci (2006) 
measured the effectiveness of their lecture-based training using a 12 questions IQ test. Some 
even had a combination of both computer-based training and instructor-led training like Ghafir et 
al. (2018).   
 In McCoy & Fowler (2004) they offered their student, faculty and staff year-round 
lecture based security training. For students, their delivery method was targeted mass e-mails, 
articles in monthly technology newsletters, ads in student newspaper and presentation for 
different groups and clubs. They have also planned additional methods to reach their on-campus 
population using security awareness posters in their residence halls, mailbox stuffers, and table 
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tents in their dining halls. Since it was hard for the university to gather all students for an in-
person training they went with a web-based training approach. When it came to training faculty 
and staff, they used a combination of multiple lecture-based training approaches including a free 
one-hour in-person training class covering multiple topics that are coordinated by different 
departments along with online training, covering the same topic, but targeting people who cannot 
attend the in-person session. They have also integrated into their training poster campaigns, 
articles in their monthly technology newsletter, targeted mass e-mails, and payroll stuffers. For 
administrators, with a tight schedule, they went with a more concise version of the training. 
Cooper (2008) followed more or less the same approach of McCoy & Fowler (2004) where their 
ISAT program was delivered as an online module to WVU students and employees. In addition 
to the online training, WVU published articles for a campus publication, presentations made at 
new employee/student orientation, poster displayed throughout campus, brochures with security 
tips distributed to employees and students, and information posted on websites visited by 
employees and students. In addition, they had targeted presentation delivered to specific 
audiences on demand. The reason for all of those alternative venues was to guarantee that the 
information learned from the curriculum is not forgotten and that employees and students are 
kept up to date on how to protect themselves from falling victims to SE.  Effective lecture-based 
training should involve additional mediums in addition to lectures in order to cement the 
information and ensure continuous awareness.         
 Robilla and Ragucci (2006) discussed a limitation of a phishing IQ test designed by Mail 
Frontier to educate users on identifying phishing vs. legitimate emails. Once a user has identified 
all the phishing from non-phishing emails, they are given a score of how well they were able to 
find phishing emails. While data showed that 82% of test takers identified phishing emails 
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correctly, it could be attributed to the fact that some test takers identify all emails as phishing 
emails. This is especially the case as worldwide only 52% of the times are phishing emails 
identified correctly. The approach they are suggesting is keeping that same test but adding a 
context-aware element to it. The idea would be to modify the test to include phishing emails for 
web sites that the users are familiar with, rather than showing them websites of companies they 
have never heard of before and would not be able to distinguish legitimate vs. illegitimate email 
coming from them. The survey developed involved 12 questions, each with an e-mail familiar to 
the survey takers in Montclair State University (MSU) and participants are asked to identify if 
the email is a phishing attempt or not.  
 The ISAT program designed and deployed by Robilla and Ragucci (2006) had a formal 
education element to it. It was a lecture where participants learn about phishing and discuss its 
implications. Another example with a formal educational element to it, that is strictly instructor-
led, was the study conducted by McCrohan et al. (2010). The study was a lecture-based approach 
that offered an intervention by randomly assigning subject to one of two introductory lectures 
about cyber threats due to poor password management. They picked passwords as a 
measurement of change in security behavior because of "their continued importance to computer 
security as well as their continued failure to provide adequate protection" (McCrohan et al., 
2010). In addition, the tendency of human to select password from a small domain and that are 
easily guessable through widely available password guessing and password-cracking tools have 
been identified in numerous studies that are discussed in McCrohan et al. (2010) research. The 
results from Robilla and Ragucci (2006) test have shown that students at MSU are mostly 
oblivious to phishing threats, but through education, they were able to correctly identify most 
threats and also indicate positive appreciation of the session and its usefulness. As for the 
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McCrohan et al. (2010) research, they concluded that when users were educated by not only 
general background information but also putting it in perspective of dangerous of week password 
to e-commerce sites, it was possible to change their behavior to enhance online security for 
themselves and the companies where they are employed.   
 Robilla and Ragucci (2006) and McCrohan et al. (2010) suggest that there is a positive 
element to instructor-led lecture-based approach but that perhaps companies and institutions 
must look for more creative and non-standard approaches to phishing awareness and SE 
education. It looks like a lecture-based delivery method is a valid starting point. Conducting an 
IQ test could be a smart way to gauge employees' phishing awareness before applying a more 
sophisticated delivery approach (Robilla and Ragucci 2006). 
 Perhaps the best lecture-based approach is the one suggested in Ghafir et al. (2018) as it 
not only combined both computer-based training and instructor-led training but also used another 
delivery method. In the research, they talked about the benefits and drawbacks of computer-
based and instructor-led training and then proposed a way to combine the best of both in a single 
hybrid system. This means their system would carry out situated learning, which would involve 
the use of a computer-based training tool along with visits by a trainer that will reinforce the 
knowledge gained by the employees through the computer-based training. The trainer would also 
offer special examples and topics that are customizable to companies' needs that have been 
identified during the planning stages. The instructor-led training sessions, while short and 
intermittent, would be continued through the computer-based tool with an integrated support 
mechanism. The training program offered in Ghafir et al. (2018) not only combines many of the 
elements discussed in the "Component of Effective Training" and offers a lecture-based delivery 
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approach involving both online and instructor-led portions, but it also designed a client-server 
program to administer the training.          
Programs/ Interactive Games Delivery Method 
 Once time has been spent into planning for the curriculum and an effective lecture-based 
delivery method is designed, it might be worth it for companies to add more advanced delivery 
methods. Such methods would be beneficial in keeping employees engaged and ensuring that 
they retain the information for a longer duration of time than just a plain lecture. One such 
delivery method is using a program or an interactive game. Two pieces of research used the 
programming approach as the delivery method. First is Ghafir et al. (2018) and the second is 
Shropshire et al (2014).  
 The program Ghafir et al. (2018) designed and implemented is a client-server situational 
security awareness framework. The server-side, allows the administrator to configure the content 
of the security program including picking the modules that best fit companies' concerns. Each 
training module covers a specific topic or aspect related to organizations' security awareness. The 
program gives visibility to the administrator to monitor the progress of each user and assign 
deadlines for the completion of different modules. The client-side includes an integrated network 
framework that monitors users' activities on their workstations and will automatically present 
relevant and informative content using pop-ups. The framework also has the capability of 
checking password strength and offering additional information on security topics.  
 In Shropshire et al. (2014), they went with a program that is more focused on monitoring 
users' activity than Ghafir et al. (2018). Their program was another web-based security program 
called Perimeter Check. The program "analyzes the user's computing environment, identifies 
potential vulnerabilities, and recommends actions that might improve the safety level for various 
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computer activities" (Shropshire et al., 2014). The program was tried by undergraduate students 
enrolled in an introductory economics course at a large university in the southeastern United 
States. From 180 students only 54 visited Perimeter Check website and used the software. To 
measure the effectiveness of the web-based products, six measurements are used and those are: 
(1) perceived ease of use, (2) perceived usefulness, (3) perceived organizational support, (4) 
adoption intention, (5) conscientiousness, and (6) agreeableness. The results were that perceived 
ease of use and perceived usefulness were found to be significant predictors of software adoption 
intention. Adoption intention, as a predictor of initial use, was found to be significant although it 
explained less variance than expected. The majority of the sample population indicated an 
intention to adopt the security measure, but less than a quarter actually followed through on their 
intentions.  
 Overall, using a program to monitor users' security behaviors, which allows users to 
receive customizable modules, offers an advanced solution to enforce good security practices in 
a continuous manner. Another similar approach involves designing programs that teach security 
content, but those programs are games. Games offer a great way to teach security concepts; those 
games are usually called Serious Games (CJ et al., 2018). One example of such games is the one 
developed by Kumaraguru et al. (2010) called Anti-Phishing Phil.   
 The game involves a young fish named Phil who wants to eat worms so he can grow up 
to be a big fish, but he must be careful to eat real worms and avoid fake ones. Each worm could 
have a real legitimate web site, thus a real worm, or it could have a phishing URL that would 
make it a fake worm. The game is split into four rounds, each of which is two minutes long. 
Before each round begins, players must view a short tutorial that provides anti-phishing tips. In 
each round, the fish is presented with eight worms, each of which carries a URL that is displayed 
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when Phil moves near it. The player would move Phil around the screen to "eat" real worms and 
avoid or reject fake ones. The game rewards the player 100 points if Phil ate a real worm or 
rejected a fake one. The game slightly penalizes players, by deducting 10 seconds off their 
current round clock, if they had Phil reject real worms (teaching users to avoid false positives). 
Players suffer severe penalties by losing one of three lives if they caused Phil to eat a fake worm. 
Players must correctly recognize a minimum of six URLs within two minutes to move to the next 
round. When a player loses all three lifelines, the game is over. At the end of every round, a 
review screen is displayed, showing all of the URLs from that round and tips for identifying 
them correctly thus making sure users learn from their mistakes in a fun way. 
 Kumaraguru et al. (2010) conducted two studies on the effectiveness of the game. One 
was a lab study and the other was a field study. In the lab study, participants were asked to 
examine 10 websites (half-legitimate and half-fake) and determine phishing ones before playing 
the game and after playing the game. They recruited 28 participants with little technical 
knowledge and randomly assigned them to either reading anti-phishing tutorial created based on 
the game or playing the actual game. For the game, they measured learner's knowledge 
acquisition by examining false positives (legitimate website determined to be fake), false 
negatives (fake website is deemed legitimate), and the total percentage of correct Web sites 
identified before and after playing the game. The game, "performed roughly as well as the 
existing training material condition in terms of false negatives, and better on false positives" 
(Kumaraguru et al., 2010). The lab experiment has shown that posttest false negatives in both 
groups decreased significantly from the results of the pretest. As for the game condition, posttest 
false positives rates decreased significantly (p < 0.03). The summary of the lab study 
demonstrates, "that users show significant improvements in their ability to identify phishing links 
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correctly after 15 minutes of training with Anti-Phishing Phil, and with the tutorials developed 
based on the game. However, participants in the game condition were better able to distinguish 
between phishing and legitimate links than those in the other conditions and were thus less likely 
to incorrectly identify legitimate links as phishing links" (Kumaraguru et al., 2010). 
 The field study portion in Kumaraguru et al. (2010) involved 4,517 people. Participants 
would be shown six websites before playing the game (pretest) and then six more websites 
immediately after playing the game (posttest). To measure retention, a delayed posttest was sent 
to participant via their emails one week after playing the game. In total, each participant in the 
game condition saw 18 Web sites divided into three groups of three phishing websites and three 
legitimate websites. Each group had a random order of the websites within each of the three 
groups and even the groups were randomly shown to participants. The results also demonstrated 
that, "users are able to more accurately and quickly distinguish phishing [websites] from 
legitimate [websites] after playing the game, and that they retain knowledge learned from the 
game for at least one week" (Kumaraguru et al., 2010). The results from both the lab study and 
field study show that the interactive gaming approach has its merits, especially in reducing false 
positives. 
 Anti-Phishing Phil was used in another research, among other methods, to test if the 
game is actually effective in teaching security concepts related to SE and phishing. The multiple 
delivery methods used in Sheng et al. (2010) were simple web-based training, PhishGuru 
cartoon, Anti-Phishing Phil game, and a combination of Anti-Phsihing Phil plus a PhishGuru 
cartoon. The web-based training involved asking participants to read three links from the first 
page of Google search with the search query 'phishing'. For the Anti-Phishing Phil game, 
participants were asked to complete three levels of the game and were allowed to exit at any 
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point. The PhishGuru training was simply looking at one page of materials, which took 
participants an average of 0.5 minutes. To measure the effectiveness of the training, participants 
participated in a role-play task with two equivalent exercises administered before and after 
training. The research found that, "Anti-Phishing Phil, the PhishGuru cartoon and Anti Phishing 
Phil with the PhishGuru cartoon did not decrease participants’ tendency to click on legitimate 
links and go to legitimate websites" and that all various educational materials performed 
similarly in reducing participants' susceptibility to fall for phishing (Sheng et al., 2010). The 
findings suggest that educational material including using the Interactive gaming approach may 
be an effective tool to enhance employees' security awareness. Interactive gaming in particular, 
is much better at making sure employees' don't identify legitimate links as phishing, unlike the 
basic web-based reading used in the research, which slightly reduced participant's tendency to 
click on legitimate links.               
 CJ et al. (2018) took a similar approach to Kumaraguru et al. (2010) where they designed 
a game called Phishy. Phishy is a game where a character lost in the seas has to overcome 
challenges in order to reach the shore, with imminent dangers prevalent at all times. Before the 
game starts, a comic format story is displayed to the player where a person called Sam, lured by 
the money award that a phishing email said he had won decided to click on the link on the email 
and provide his bank details. It was too late from him to realize that he was a victim of a 
phishing attempt and that criminals have taken all his money and left him on a boat with a 
hungry tiger in the middle of the sea. Sam needs to get back to the shore. In order to do so, he 
must hook up fishes to his snare and then answer a question whether a certain URL is a phishing 
attempt. False positives and false negatives result in deduction of points and the Tiger getting 
closer to Sam. However, a true positive or true negative will reward Sam points and the hungry 
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tiger will eat the fish. The game has three different levels, each level dedicated to certain types of 
URLs. After completion, a brief summary of all the questions from that level is shown. Before 
and after the game, players are asked a set of questions via a Survey. The player must answer the 
pre-game survey in order to continue in the game. When the game ends, a similar set of 
questions follow and the responses are analyzed to evaluate their performance. The game was 
successfully completed by 8071 associates within a month. The game data of associates who 
completed the game showed significant improvement in identifying phishing links. Furthermore, 
from the feedback it looks like players truly enjoyed the game, some even playing it more than 
once.      
Group-Oriented Delivery Method 
 Another advanced delivery method is the group-oriented delivery method. The focus of 
the delivery method is to build a security culture where employees feel confident to share 
security risks with each other and benefit from each other's experiences. The training is usually 
focused on collective teams putting their minds together to tackle cyber security issues through 
dialogue, open-ended questions, group reflections, etc (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2009). The 
importance of organizations having an information security culture is mentioned in Flores & 
Ekstedt (2016). Chow & Chan (2008) define organizational culture to be, "related to employees’ 
perception of shared beliefs and values among employees in the work environment, and points 
out the quality (e.g., richness and friendliness) of social relationships at the workplace" (as cited 
in Flores & Ekstedt, 2016). According to Chang & Lin (2007), organizational culture in an 
information security setting is "significantly influenc[ing] information security measures 
(confidentiality, availability, and accountability)" (as cited in Flores & Ekstedt, 2016). Thus 
Flores & Ekstedt (2016) finds it to be a logical deduction to believe that fostering an information 
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security culture in the context of SE, could have a direct association with an employee’s 
information security awareness, attitude, and beliefs about security threats. 
 In the research, they proposed three hypotheses related to the role of information security 
culture. The first hypothesis is that an organization’s information security culture is positively 
associated with an employee’s information security awareness. The second hypothesis is that an 
organization’s information security culture is positively associated with an employee’s attitude 
toward resisting SE; finally, information security culture in an organization is positively 
associated with an employee’s normative beliefs about resisting SE (Flores & Ekstedt, 2016). 
They sent out a survey to 4296 employees (37% responded), between January 2013 and October 
2013, from organizations operating in a variety of industries and found that the three hypotheses 
are statistically likely (p < 0.01). This means that all three hypotheses are supported by the data 
at a very high statistical significance rate. Thus, it is important for companies to integrate a 
positive information security culture to raise the awareness of employees in information security 
and resisting SE. 
 A great way for companies and organizations to build a positive information security 
culture is through an intervention similar to the one conducted by Albrechtsen & Hovden (2009). 
In the intervention, they created six small-sized workshops (15-20 participants each with about 
100 participants total) aimed at improving the behavior and awareness of employees on cyber 
security issues. The workshop took place at a Norwegian public administration agency where 
they randomly placed 197 employees into an intervention group participating in the workshop 
and a control group not participating in the workshop. 
 The idea behind the workshop is not to be one-way communication but rather a forum of 
discussion where participants do most of the talking and create reflections. The security officer 
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would ask a simple question like 'Why do we need information security?' and the participants 
collectively answer the question. The participants of each workshop were divided into seven 
groups of 2-3 persons sitting next to each other and each group was given a different scenario 
that they tried together to come up with a way to deal with the scenario in a secure manner. After 
the scenarios, each group of participants presented how they dealt with the scenario and the other 
groups commented on the way the group handled it.  They evaluated the effectiveness of the 
workshop in changing behavior by designing three surveys: one to be filled before the workshop, 
and two after the workshop. The first survey was performed one month before the intervention 
and the other two surveys were performed 1 month and six months after the intervention. Their 
statistical analysis revealed that the intervention was capable of changing a broad range of 
awareness and behaviors, while the control group showed no significant changes (Albrechtsen & 
Hovden, 2009).  
 Group discussion was even done earlier by Robila & Ragucci back in 2006 in addition to 
the instructor-led lecture. They followed it by a discussion of the nature of the phishing emails 
and the methods that can be employed by attackers to generate better-targeted messages as well 
as identify many browsers and web vulnerabilities. Next, it involved a discussion of ways to 
increase public awareness of phishing and fostered debates on aggressive vs. passive education. 
Creating an ISAT program that involves employees' input is a great way for them to have a stake 
in the security of their organizations.   
Simulated Attack Delivery Method 
 Perhaps the most realistic method is the simulated attacks delivery approach. It involves 
performing simulated attacks through the usage of fake emails designed by the organization 
sponsoring the training to try to trick their employees into clicking links or downloading 
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attachments in the emails. Alternatively, organizations can request the assistance of an external 
specialized company to conduct phishing or SE attacks on their employees. This approach was 
suggested by Valentine (2006) to be used in the third phase after assessment and identification—
that is the education phase. The idea would be to have a scenario-based training where 
employees are placed in test situations involving potential attacks. For example, it could be a SE 
attempt for employees with access to the company's server room. The idea would be to use the 
results from the attack to educate employees on areas directly affecting their work—that is, it is 
relevant to them. This is exactly what the United States Military Academy (USMA) did back in 
2007.  
 Dodge et al. (2007) discuss the USMA unannounced simulated security exercises. In the 
exercise, participants are not aware of the simulated attack. The trainers would surprise them by 
sending unannounced phishing emails. Some of the important considerations the research took 
into account were making sure that when they send those emails they dissociate them from IT 
and that they involve legal staff. They decided to dissociate the emails from IT so that the trust 
between the IT staff and the participants, students at USMA, is not compromised. In addition, 
they recommended the involvement of legal staff as they "can provide opinions and guidance on 
human subject research requirement and assessment on personal privacy" (Dodge et al., 2007). 
In their simulated email attacks, they had different types of emails. The first type of emails was 
one that uses an embedded link to see if users would actually click it. The second type of emails 
was attachment email where the participants are tricked into opening an attachment. The third 
type was sensitive information emails, which measures participants' susceptibility to fall for SE 
and disclose sensitive information. The fourth and final type of email is one where the 
participants would be tricked into downloading an application or an executable. The results show 
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that the failure rate of an embedded link, attachment, and sensitive information were all high. 
Participants clicked on those links even though they admitted it looked odd. The one that had the 
most failures was the attachment type emails. Through the results, USMA were able to determine 
that when they conduct ISAT, they should focus on the danger of opening unknown attachments. 
Having sporadic and unannounced simulated attacks offer a safe environment to assess the 
elements that should be further stressed in future ISATs.       
 In Jagetic et al. (2007), they went with a realistic simulated phishing email approach 
where they actually "harvested freely available acquaintance data by crawling social network 
[websites]", building "a database with tens of thousands of relationships", and then cross-
correlating the data with Indiana University's address book database to find students who could 
be used in the research. They then selected students ages 18-24 based on the "amount and quality 
of publicly available information they disclosed about themselves" (Jagetic et al., 2007) and used 
them in the study where they targeted the participants with phishing emails that were 
personalized to them. "A total of 1,731 participants were included in the study—921 subjects 
received phishing attacks and 810 had their email addresses spoofed" (Jagetic et al., 2007). The 
research here raises awareness about the weakness of humans regarding their willingness to 
share information about themselves publicly without stopping to think of the consequences.  
 The intent of the experiment was to "quantify, in an ethical manner, how reliable social 
context would increase the success of phishing attacks" (Jagetic et al., 2007). The control group 
in the experiment received an email but without the social context. The experiment found 16% 
success rate (defined as people falling for the phishing attempt) among the control group, which 
they attributed to the fact that there is a "subtle context associated with the fictitious sender’s 
email address and the university domain name identified in the phishing hyperlink" (Jagetic et 
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al., 2007). The experimental group success rate was at 72%, which was higher than what they 
had anticipated. Some students continued visiting the phishing link after providing their 
university credential as they bought the message that is displayed upon successful sign-in, which 
would say that the server is busy, and ask them to try later. It was concluded based on the results 
that having a social context leads people to overlook important clues that could have given away 
that the link is not legitimate and thus they become vulnerable.  
 Other noteworthy results were that they found "females [to be] more likely to become 
victims [of phishing attacks] (77% versus 65% for males). Furthermore, the attack was more 
successful if the spoofed message appeared to be sent by a person of the opposite gender. This 
was true for both males and females, but the effect was more marked for males (68% if the 
message was from a female versus 53% if from another male)" (Jagetic et al., 2007). The 
research shows that simulated attack approach with social-context is highly effective and 
dangerous and thus companies implementing such methods would be able, in a realistic way, to 
tap into their employees' weakness and find strategies to mitigate such risks before a real 
malicious actor exploits those social weaknesses. 
 Kumaraguru et al. (2007) offer a way to use the embedded training email system to 
educate users rather than just serving as a test for the susceptibility of employees—like done by 
Jagetic et al. (2007) and Valentine (2006). The idea is to periodically send users simulated 
phishing emails, perhaps from their system administrator or from a training company, and 
educating them if they fall for the emails. Users would access these training emails in their inbox 
while they are checking their regular emails. These training emails are designed to look just like 
phishing emails, urging people to go to some website and log in. If people fall for the training 
email (that is, they click on a link in that email), they are provided an intervention message that 
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explains that they are at risk for phishing attacks and are given some tips to protect themselves 
(Kumaraguru et al., 2010). In a previous study, they have shown that users improved their ability 
to identify phishing emails directly after the training. Thus in this study, they are seeking to 
measure how well participants retain the information they learn through the training and how 
they will apply the knowledge to other emails.  
 They proposed five hypotheses of which four were supported. The first supported 
hypothesis was that "users learn more effectively when training materials are presented after they 
fall for a phishing attack (embedded) than when the training materials are sent by email (non-
embedded)" (Kumaraguru et al. 2007; Kumaraguru et al. 2010). The second supported 
hypothesis is that "users retain more knowledge about how to avoid phishing attacks when 
trained with embedded training than with non-embedded training" (Kumaraguru et al. 2007; 
Kumaraguru et al. 2010). The third supported hypothesis is that "users transfer more knowledge 
about how to avoid phishing attacks when trained with embedded training than with non-
embedded training" (Kumaraguru et al. 2007; Kumaraguru et al. 2010). The final supported 
hypothesis is that "confronted with a novel situation, those with higher scores on the CRT will be 
more likely than users with lower scores to click on the links in the phishing emails from 
companies with which they have no account" (Kumaraguru et al. 2007). CRT stands for 
Cognitive Reflection Test and it is a three questions test that in order to be answered correctly 
requires the test taker to suppress their impulsivity. Fredrick (2005), the designer of CRT, argues 
that it measures "the ability or disposition to resist reporting the response that first comes to 
mind" (as cited in Kumaraguru et al. 2007).  Fredrick found that "higher CRT scores correlate 
with more risk-taking" (Kumaraguru et al. 2007).  
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 To test their hypotheses in the study, they analyzed data for 42 participants randomly 
assigned to one of three conditions. First, an “embedded” condition in which participants were 
shown the training material when they clicked on links in the simulated phishing emails. Second 
is a “non-embedded” condition in which participants were shown training materials in an email 
message and the third is a “control” condition in which participants did not receive any training 
materials but received an additional email from a friend (Kumaraguru et al. 2007). The results 
found that users who were in the "embedded" condition learn more effectively when the training 
materials are presented after users fall for the attack and that they tend to make better decisions 
than those in the "non- embedded" condition. In fact, they found that users in the "non-embedded 
condition did not perform significantly better after training than those in the control condition 
(who had received no training)" (Kumaraguru et al. 2007). Participants in the "embedded" 
condition spent time reading the material presented to them after falling for the attack than those 
in the "non-embedded" condition and they were able to retain and transfer more knowledge than 
the "non-embedded" condition. The finding suggests that when people are given a reason that 
motivates them to read the training materials, they will read it. It looks like falling for a 
simulated attack is an effective way to tell the users that they have a problem and that they need 
to be trained. The research has also found that people in the "embedded" condition, when tested 
after seven days, retained the information and they were able to transfer their knowledge to other 
types of phishing emails (Kumaraguru et al. 2007).      
 In 2009, Kumaraguru et al. expanded their previous work by testing the effectiveness of 
the embedded-training system (PhishGuru) using a real-world study of 515 participants in order 
to measure long-term retention and the effect of two training messages. Simulated emails sent 
through the PhishGuru training system are more than just a mechanism of training delivery, "but 
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also a test of whether the recipient has learned how to distinguish legitimate from phishing 
messages" (Kumaraguru et al., 2009). "A real deployment of the system would not only train 
users but also assess their performance at regular intervals" (Kumaraguru et al., 2009). This 
approach offers a great way for companies to "identify and present training interventions only to 
those users who continue to fall for the simulated phishing attacks. In addition, this approach can 
be used to introduce recipients to new phishing threats over time and focus on those recipients 
who are most susceptible to the new threats" (Kumaraguru et al., 2009). 
 The 515 participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: "control", "one-
train" (one message), and "two-train" (two messages). There were 172 participants in both the 
control and the one-train groups and 171 participants in the "two-train". All participants received 
three legitimate and seven simulated spear-phishing emails over the course of 28 days. The 
researchers had three hypotheses. First, " participants in the training conditions (one-train and 
two-train) identify phishing emails better than those in the control condition on every day except 
day 0" (Kumaraguru et al., 2009). Second, "participants who see the training interventions twice 
perform better than participants who see the intervention once" (Kumaraguru et al., 2009). 
Finally, "when asked to identify legitimate emails participants who view the training materials in 
the training conditions will perform the same as participants in the control condition" 
(Kumaraguru et al., 2009).  
 In Kumaraguru et al. (2009) they have found that participants who trained with 
PhishGuru retained knowledge for 28 days, more than the 2007 research where they have proven 
that information was retained after seven days from the training. They have also found that 
adding a second training message for people who fall for the phishing email decreased the 
likelihood of people providing their information to phishing websites. Furthermore, the training 
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did not decrease people's willingness to click on links in legitimate messages. The results suggest 
that simulated emails offer a great delivery method for training and one that will not discourage 
people from clicking on a legitimate link. The research shows that people will be more likely to 
focus on the training when they see that they have an issue—that is they were tricked into 
providing their sensitive information. 
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Discussion of Findings 
 Review of the literature for the past twenty years shows that major work has been done 
around the world to mitigate the risk to information security from the employees who depend on 
it and in some cases even those who are tasked with protecting it. Despite all these efforts, the 
2019 State of the Phish Report indicates, "in general, end users are not familiar with commonly 
used [InfoSec] terms. In addition — and of particular concern — many are relying on IT teams 
to automatically discover and fix accidental downloads of malicious software. The lack of clarity 
with regard to the role of IT in attack prevention could be giving users a false sense of security 
and unnecessarily taxing [InfoSec] resources" (Proofpoint, 2019). Proofpoint determined that 
this is the case by asking "five relatively simple, multiple-choice questions of 7,000 end users 
across seven countries (the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Australia, and Japan). All questions 
focused on fundamental [cyber security] concepts, including high-profile topics (like phishing 
and ransomware), and lesser-known but frequently experienced attacks like smishing (SMS/text 
message phishing) and vishing (voice phishing)" (Proofpoint, 2019). In the report, they also 
highlighted average failure rate for multiple industries were ranging between 16% failure rate at 
the high end and 6% at the low end. As for average failure by department, they found that the 
highest were: (1) Commercial (19%); (2) Purchasing (14%); (3) Communication and Sales 
(13%); (4) Maintenance and Security (12%); (5) Executives, Legal, Marketing, Procurement and 
Treasury (11%). The alarming part of the report is that some of the departments keeping 
sensitive data are at the top of the list.     
 There are two reasons that could explain why this is still an issue to date. First, it could be 
that ISAT designer and trainers for companies, if exist, are not aware of this literature. Second, it 
could be that the designer and trainers are aware of the literature and that tools are available out 
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there that addresses many of the elements in the literature review, but companies are not invested 
in it. Proofpoint (2019) dedicates a great portion of their report to the helpfulness of mature 
phishing awareness training in combating SE. The report claims that they "observed a 9% 
average failure rate across all simulated phishing campaign styles and all industries" and that "it 
held steady from 2017, a good sign that end users continue to apply learned skills and remain 
alert to different phishing lures and traps" (Proofpoint, 2019).  
 All these results show that ISAT quality is inadequate, but training is progressively 
becoming more effective as companies invest more time on it and take it seriously. Proof Point 
report data "shows a terrific trend for organizations that are committed to longer-term security 
awareness and training initiatives: Average failure rates fall steadily as programs continue, with 
the biggest gains happening in programs that have been running for at least a year" (Proofpoint, 
2019). Here are some recommendations based on the results obtained from the literature review. 
The first recommendation is that all companies should invest in having some form of ISAT as 
much as they invest in security hardware. They should also be patient with it, as it will not work 
magically the first time it is applied. ISAT quality improves as it increases in maturity. The 
second recommendation is for companies to know which types of employees are vulnerable to 
which type of attacks and how cybercriminals are targeting those specific job functions. "When 
organizations can identify their 'Very Attacked People (VAPs),' they can then test specific 
departments and individuals, isolate potential vulnerabilities, and deliver targeted security 
awareness training assignments to improve knowledge and reduce risk" (Proofpoint, 2019). This 
becomes especially important in the early planning stages of an ISAT program, when modifying 
a purchased package, or as the program is being refined. The third recommendation is that 
companies already implementing ISAT should continue developing their programs by finding 
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new attack vectors and applying continuous refinement as the threat intelligence landscape 
changes. The fourth recommendation is for the training to involve a combination of the delivery 
methods discussed in the literature review and be a year-round rather than just one-and-done 
compliance check task. The fifth recommendation is for companies to evaluate multiple 
packages available and think of ways they can modify them to fit their organizations' needs 
rather than starting from scratch. The exact combination of design and delivery method is up for 
each company to decide based on experiments. Eventually, they will find something that works 
for them and that is effective. 
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Conclusion 
 Phishing is one of the most prevalent methods used by adversaries to target companies 
and organizations as it takes advantage of common human weaknesses to conduct successful 
attacks with minimal technical efforts. The best defense against such prevalent practice is using 
ISAT programs. However, implementing a successful ISAT program is complicated and 
involves multiple considerations and design decisions. In addition, convincing companies and 
employees of its importance is an arduous task mainly because of the existence of many 
ineffective examples. In order to fix ISAT shortcomings, the literature recommends spending 
ample amount of time upfront designing the program and tailoring it to companies' needs and 
employees' needs. Once a decision has been made on content, as well as which employees will 
receive which training, companies may elect to choose one or more of four delivery methods. 
Those delivery methods could be lecture-based, program/interactive games, group-oriented, or 
simulated attacks. Each of the delivery methods has its own time and place in order to be most 
effective. Organizations and companies should figure out for themselves what combination to 
use and when, and make sure that their training continues in year round basis.  As companies go 
through multiple trial and errors, their ISAT program will mature. The more mature the ISAT 
program is, the more effective it will be in changing people's behavior and companies will start 
seeing a huge return on investment. The research has shown that while employees continue to 
fall for SE attacks going to 2019, there have been noticeable improvements due to the 
effectiveness of ISAT programs. Thus, the take home point from this research is that ISAT 
programs can be effective in changing behavior and securing the companies human assets if they 
were taken seriously and given priority like any other security mechanism.  
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